UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-19-2018

C&M Investment Group, Ltd. v. Campbell Appellant's Reply Brief
Dckt. 44719

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs

Recommended Citation
"C&M Investment Group, Ltd. v. Campbell Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 44719" (2018). Idaho Supreme
Court Records & Briefs, All. 7093.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7093

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP,
Plaintiffs/Petitioners/Respondent,
NEIL DAVID CAMPBELL, individually,
Defendant/Respondent/Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 44719

)
and

)

PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually;
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a
corporation; GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a
corporation; PROTECCION FORESTAL
DE TECA, S.S., A corporation; and DOES I
through 50 inclusive,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofidaho, in and for the
County of Blaine.
Honorable Robert J. Elgee, District Judge, Presiding.

Neil David Campbell
P.O. Box 3372
Ketchum, ID 83340
Telephone: 208-309-3705

Pro Se for Defendant/Respondent/
Appellant

Erin Clark
P.O. Box 3310
Ketchum, ID 83340
Telephone: 208-725-0055
Fax: 208-725-0076
Attorneys for Plaintif.fe!Petitioners
/Respondents
C&M Investment Group and
Karlin Holdings LP
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III.
ARGUMENT IN REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
1. ARGUMENTS IN REPLY TO WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED
IN SENTENCING MR. CAMPBELL TO JAIL WITHOUT HONORING HIS RIGHT
AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION AS PROVIDED FOR BY IRCP 75(i)(2).
A. INTRODUCTION AND RELEVANT FACTS.
The relevant facts of this case are the District Court required Campbell to take the stand
and testify against himself in a contempt of court case containing 24 counts of contempt seeking
the imposition of a Criminal Sanction. Campbell was found guilty of 13 counts of contempt of
court seeking a Criminal Sanction and not guilty of 11 counts of contempt of court seeking a
Criminal Sanction. IO counts of contempt of court seeking a Civil Sanction were pursued by
Respondents, with 8 of those 10 counts dismissed during their closing argument. 34 counts of
contempt of court seeking a Criminal Sanction and 2 counts of Contempt of Court seeking a
Civil Sanction were submitted to the District Court for decision.
Campbell was sentenced to 65 days in jail (5 x 13) as a Criminal Sanction. His right
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against self-incrimination was not honored by the District Court.

It is against this factual back drop that Respondents argue the combined nature of the case
made the District Comi's decision to violate Campbell's right against self-incrimination and
impose a Criminal Sanction of65 days in jail pennissible, and that the Criminal Sanction
imposed by the District Court was harmless error.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(i)(2) sets forth the rights required to impose a Criminal
Sanction and in relevant part states,

"(i) Nonsummary Proceedings; Trial . ... (2) Trial Rights Required to Impose a
Criminal Sanction. The court cannot impose a criminal sanction following a trial
unless the respondent was provided the following rights: ... (D) the privilege
against self-incrimination, ... " IRCP 75(/)(2).
"We exercise free review over the issues of law decided by the district court to determine
whether it correctly stated and applied the applicable law." State ofIdaho Department ofHealth

and Welfare v. Slane, 155 Idaho 274,276 (2013)
"This Court exercises free review over questions regarding the interpretation of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure." Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99,
294 P.3d 1111, 1115 (2013).
"Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(4) allows a direct appeal from an order of contempt.
Thus, we review an appeal from an order of contempt the same as any other
appeal' . . . . We review the sanction imposed upon a finding of contempt for an
abuse of discretion." Carr v. Pridgen, 157 Idaho 238,242 (2014).
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"To detennine whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court asks: (1)
Whether the trial COUli correctly perceived this issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason."
Duspiva v. Fillmore, 154 Idaho 27, 35 (2013).
C. IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 75(i)(2) CONTAINS NO
EXCEPTIONS PERMITTING THE IMPOSITION OF A CRIMINAL SANCTION FOR
CASES POSSESSING CONTEMPT OF COURT COUNTS SEEKING BOTH CIVIL
SANCTIONS AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS.

C&M Investment Group, LTD and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership (collectively
"Respondents") first attempt to argue that since they choose to pursue Contempt of Court counts
seeking the imposition of a Criminal Sanction and a Civil Sanction in the same case, Neil
Campbell (hereinafter "Campbell") is no longer entitled to his privilege against selfincrimination. They go to immense efforts to point out that the civil contempt counts were
factually distinct from the criminal contempt counts, and rely repeatedly on the District Court's
statement making this finding. Respondent's ignore both IRCP 75(i)(2) and State ofIdaho

Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Slane, 155 Idaho 274.
Respondents' Brief attempts to frame the issue as follows, "this, of course, makes for a
different case than the ones to which Campbell relies, namely trials of factually related civil and
criminal counts" Respondent's Brief, Page 1.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(i)(2) in relevant part states,
"(i) Nonsummary Proceedings; Trial. ... (2) Trial Rights Required to Impose a
Criminal Sanction. The court cannot impose a criminal sanction following a trial
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unless the respondent was provided the following rights: ... (D) the privilege
against self-incrimination, ... " IRCP 75(i)(2).
There is no ambiguity in the language ofidaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(i)(2)(D).
While Respondents would very much like to add to the language ofIRCP 75(i)(2), its current
language defeats their argument.
IRCP 75(i)(2) does not state the court cannot impose a criminal sanction following a trial
which only seeks the imposition of a criminal sanction (added hypothetical language) unless the
respondent was provide the following rights: ... (D) the privilege against self-incrimination.
Respondents have cited no authority for their argument the right against selfincrimination disappears in contempt cases containing counts of contempt of court seeking to
impose both a Civil Sanction and a Criminal Sanction in the same case. As discussed above,
Respondents ignore IRCP 75(i)(2). Respondents also ignore and disregard the guidance provided
by the Idaho Supreme Court which states,
"[I]f both civil and criminal relief are imposed in the same proceeding, then the
'criminal feature of the order is dominant and fixes its character for purposes of
review.' ... A court can impose a criminal contempt sanction in nonsummary
contempt proceedings only if the contemn or has been afforded the federal
constitutional rights applicable to criminal contempt of court (Emphasis
Added) . ... The father has not contended on appeal that he was not afforded the
constitutional rights applicable to criminal contempt proceedings" State ofIdaho
Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Slane, 155 Idaho 274,277.
Under IRCP 7 5(i)(2), the District Court did not possess the ability to impose a Criminal
Sanction once it required Campbell to take the stand and testify against himself. The fact that
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both Criminal Sanctions and Civil Sanctions were sought in the same trial does not change the
language ofIRCP 7 5(i)(2). Simply put, Campbell was not afforded his constitutional right
against self-incrimination applicable to criminal contempt proceedings when he was forced to
take the witness stand. This eliminated the District Court's ability to impose a Criminal
Sanction.
D. IMPOSITION OF AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE IS PREJUDICIAL AND
AFFECTS A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF CAMPBELL.
The Respondents' next argue that the District Court's imposition of a 65 day jail sentence
has harmless error and is not prejudicial. This argument seems absurd on its face when the
language ofIRCP 75(i)(2)(D) cited above is considered along with the fact Campbell is facing 65
days in jail. The imposition of a Criminal Sanction of a 65 day jail sentence given the right
against self-incrimination in IRCP 75(i)(2) is prejudicial.
"Unless an error affects a substantial right of a party, the error does not constitute grounds
for reversal." State v. Watldns, 148 Idaho 418,420 (2009). "What is an error affecting a
substantial right is not defined by the Rules of Evidence, but must be detennined on a case-bycase basis." State v. Goerig, 121 Idaho 108, 111 (App. 1991).
The 65 day jail sentence was an illegal sentence under Idaho law.
"For the purpose of Rule 35, an illegal sentence is one in excess of a statutory
provision or otherwise contrary to applicable law. United States v. Huss, 520 F.2d
598 (2d Cir. 1975). It is self-evident that this determination involved a legal
question on which we exercise free review .... Furthermore, unlike a legal but
allegedly excessive sentence, an illegal sentence may be corrected 'at any time."
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State v. Lee, 116 Idaho 515, 516 (App. 1989).
As Campbell has discussed above, once the District Court disregarded his constih1tional
right against self-incrimination, it lost its ability to impose a Criminal Sanction consisting of 65
days in jail. That makes the 65 day jail sentence illegal as it is contrary to applicable law, IRCP
75(i)(2)(D). This illegal sentence may be corrected at any time, which eliminates Respondents'
hannless error argument.
The District Court's error in this case consisted of sentencing Campbell to 65 days in jail
after refusing to honor his constitutional right against self-incrimination .. Mr. Ritzau objected
when Campbell was called to the stand to notify the District Court of the requirements of
75(i)(2)(D) and avoid a waiver issue. If the District Court had decided to NOT impose a
Criminal Sanction at the sentencing hearing, then its sentence would not be erroneous regardless
of its ruling requiring Campbell take the stand. It is the imposition of a Criminal Sanction after
failing to honor Campbell's right against self-incrimination, not its ruling requiring he take the
stand which was erroneous, prejudicial, and hannful error which affected a substantial right.
IV.
CONCLUSION

For these reasons presented herein, Campbell asks the Court to vacate the District Court's
decision imposing a Criminal Sanction of 65 days in jail. Since Campbell was not provided his
right against self-incrimination, a Criminal Sanction can not be imposed in this case.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this__!}_ day of March, 2018.
NEIL DAYID CAMPBELL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

_jJ_

day of March, 2018, I served a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
copy of the within and foregoing document upon the following attorneys for Appellant:
Erin Clark
Lawson, Laski, Clark & Pogue, PLLC
PO Box 3310
Ketchum, ID 83340
Fax: 208-725-0076
By transmitting copies by email.

V

By depositing copies of the same with Federal Express for overnight delivery.
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